A Quick Introduction

Some time ago I wrote a short article for a Mexican magazine in which I offered an alternative version of the outcome of WW2. The change in history that my tale revolved around occured on 3rd September 1940 which in turn led to a difference in strategy from reality taken by the German airforce, the Luftwaffe, during the battle of Britain.

A Brief Summary of The Battle of Britain

The Battle of Britain, as it became known, was fought mainly in the skies above the south east of England during late summer and into the Autumn of 1940. The aim of the Germans was to clear southern England of the menace posed by the Royal Air Force's Fighter Command, in particular those squadrons flying as part of 11 Group. Once this was achieved the way was open for attacks on the Royal Navy in preparation for Operation Sealion, the German invasion of mainland Britain. All the RAF had to do was survive and prevent the Luftwaffe's dominance of the skies until the late Autumn weather prevented the launch of Operation Sea Lion.

From 10th July the first signs of the coming battle began when the Luftwaffe conducted limited attacks on British targets. For the first four to five weeks the raids were fairly small targeting shiping, harbours and factories. In the main these attacks were primarily aimed at drawing the British fighters into the air where they could be destroyed by the superior numbers of German planes. From the middle of August the raids intensified and RAF airfields and aircraft factories were added to the list of targets in a direct attack on fighter command. The airfields of 11 Group stationed in the south east of England and around London were hit particularly badly with many of the forward air bases on the Kent coast becoming unusable because of the risk of attack.

The Luftwaffe continued the attacks and by early September it appeared to the Germans that victory was now within their grasp. It had taken their war machine much longer than they had anticipated, mainly due to their own mistakes, but slowly they were grinding away at Fighter Command and slowly Fighter Command was weakening.

The position was grim in the extreme as from August 24th to September 6th. 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. Worst of all, during the fortnight 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of less than 1,000.

Experienced pilots were like gold dust, and each one lost had to be replaced by an untried man who for some time would be vulnerable, until he acquired battle know-how. Fresh squadrons, moved in to replace tired units, very often lost more aircraft and pilots than the formations they replaced. For instance, 616 Squadron lost twelve aircraft and five pilots between August 25th and September 2nd and had to be retired to Coltishall in No.12 Group.

No. 603 Squadron, newly arrived in 11 Group on August 28th, had by September 6th lost sixteen aircraft and twelve pilots, while 253 Squadron at Kenley lost thirteen Hurricanes and nine pilots in the seven days they were in battle, from August 30th.

On 3rd September Herman Göring, the man in charge of the Luftwaffe, called a meeting at The Hague with two of his commanders, Kesselring and Sperle. Kesselring proposed that the attacks on Britain should be switched from fighter airfields to the city of London, but Sperle did not agree stating that the RAF had more reserves than they were led to believe. Kesselring and Göring believed wrongly that fighter command had no more than 300 fighters available and Kesselring’s contention was that a direct attack on London during daylight hours would be enough to tempt the remaining British fighters into the air where they could be crushed. The date of the attack was to be the 7th September.

In between missions to England by day and by night from September 3rd to the 6th, the Luftwaffe was busy in its preparations for what they hoped would be the final blow to the RAF. They undertook repairs to as many aircraft as possible enabling them to strengthen their bomber units. In addition the fighter units armed with the Bf109 single engine fighter always criticised for its short range were moved to locations as close to the French coast as possible.

The 6th September 1940 was a day when extreme pressure was brought upon Fighter Command. Six of the seven sector airfields had suffered considerable damage and five of the advanced air bases along the Kent coast fared no better. Losses of aircraft again exceeded production and pilot strength was now down from 1300 in early July to about 700 due not only to those that were posted missing or killed but also those that had suffered burns and broken bones.

Air Chief Marshall Hugh Dowding in charge of RAF's Fighter Command knew the situation, he knew that if the RAF was ever to gain the upper hand his pilots would have to shoot down the German planes at a rate of three to one. He felt that at this stage when a number of his airfields were so close to being non-operational and with his pilots so tired that the task was next to impossible. In Dowdings own words, "... all we can do is to pray to God, because only a miracle can save us now."

On 7th September the German attacks were directed towards the East End of London, the bombs dropping on the docks, factories and warehouses sited on the shores of the Thames. As they had done on previous days Fighter Command sent its squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes into the air in defence of the airfields expecting the Germans to follow the same pattern as they had done time and time again. Once the initial confusion subsided both sides met almost head on above the Thames with both sides taking heavy losses. That night the German bombers returned in what would be the first of several months worth of nightly attacks on the cities of Britain.

However the switch of targets was a blessing to the RAF at this vital time when the cracks were starting to show and it gave Fighter Command time to rebuild and regain some of its strength. It was also a relief for those on the ground, the repair crews, the command and control staff and the mechanics as they were no longer on the frontline and could now get back to supporting those in the air defending Britain.

History shows that this change of targets may well have been the turning point in the Battle. Never again would Fighter Command suffer such destruction and the German daytime raids, with the exception of 15th September (which became known as Battle of Britain day), began to lessen in strength until eventually they stopped.

However, I've often wondered what might have happened if the attacks HAD continued on the airfields as I postulated in my article. This Blog is dedicated to my exploration of the subject, something I began many, many months ago and something that has taken on a life of its own.

In his opening introduction to the Symposium on the Battle of Britain, Air Chief Marshall Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris spoke of an exercise (See Adler) he had been asked to conduct –

“… I will tell you one thing about this exercise which I hope will give you food for thought. I was detached as a member of the Directing Staff to write a big appreciation exercise on the Battle of Britain and after a week I sought an interview with the Assistant Commandant. I said ‘I am awfully sorry, but I have applied all the usual considerations to the exercise – such as factors affecting the attainment of the aim and the balance of the forces – and the Germans must win. What do I do? He said ‘Go and fudge it!’, so I did and it has been fudged ever since.
This brings me to the only other thing that I am going to say in the short time that I have been allotted. We really do want to know not only why we won, but whether we did win. So please do not toe the party line when you are studying and reporting on this exercise. If you are merely going to repeat what everyone else has said – and there are twenty-eight new books this year on the subject (1990) – it really is rather a waste of time. But if you can think of anything original that might possibly have affected the battle, for heaven’s sake bring it up. I know that I reflect the views of the Commandant and the Directing Staff in saying this.”

This is partly the inspiration for my research and his words ring true … let’s bring new ideas to this subject.

Research and Reference

The following list of sources is not exhaustive; many others have been used in my research of the subject and to fill in specific holes that the following sources hint at. For instance where there are confused or conflicting details of downed RAF aircraft other sources have been accessed to give clarity. I have always consciously avoided referencing personal biographies and autobiographies of historical events as they can tend to be a little one sided and lead the reader down a path guided by the author despite them often being a very good read and full of useful information … but I have found that information regularly needs to be verified.

1. The Battle Re-Thought – A symposium on the Battle of Britain; Sponsored jointly by the Royal Air Force Historical Society and the Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell dated 25th June 1990. To commemorate the 50th anniversary of the battle a seminar was held at Bracknell on 25th June 1990 attended by 300 delegates. Those present included students of the RAF Staff College, serving airmen, historians, men who were involved in the battle and a group of similar delegates from Germany. The morning session was devoted to six papers presented to those gathered covering various aspects of the battle and the afternoon involved group discussion between those present about the aspects presented in the morning. This 120 page document contains edited text of the talks and a summary of the main discussion points.
2. The Defence of the United Kingdom, Basil Collier 1957 (Part of the History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Series). This publication provides details of the actions taken by the UK to ensure that threat of invasion was negated including not only those taken during the war but also the thinking behind the strategies devised between the wars. It includes a wealth of knowledge gleaned from official War Office documents, for which the author was given full access, including very useful maps and illustrations.
3. RAF Aircraft L1000-N9999. James Halley. Air Britain, RAF Aircraft P1000-R9999. James Halley. Air Britain, RAF Aircraft T1000-V9999. James Halley. Air Britain, RAF Aircraft W1000-Z9999. James Halley. Air Britain, (This series of books contain listings of aircraft built and supplied to the Royal Air Force. The listings include delivery dates by month and year, the registration number of each plane, the units the aircraft served in and what the final fate of the aircraft was.)
4. http://www.spitfires.ukf.net – a comprehensive listing of Spitfire/Seafire aircraft which expands greatly and adds more detail to the entries found in the RAF Aircraft listings above.
5. www.the-battle-of-britain.co.uk – a good site that includes a list of all pilots who took part in the Battle of Britain and a summary of the actions they were involved in.
6. www.raf.mod.uk – a good source for all things Royal Air Force which includes a useful section on the Battle of Britain particularly useful as a tool for cross referencing other sources and checking information found elsewhere. Includes summaries of each days action, the targets, the state of the RAF and statistics.
7. www.battleofbritain1940.net – The Battle of Britain Historical Society website. An excellent website that includes a chronology of the Battle of Britain in detail describing the major actions of each day and providing useful background information on the strategies used and the equipment involved. It also provides eye witness accounts from those involved and relevant passages from the numerous books written on the subject by a number of different authors.
8. www.naval-history.net – a good source of information relating to naval operations, ship movements, battles and air attacks.
9. www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar - a series of individual articles written by various authors on the events of World War 2.
10. www.pastscape.org.uk – contains information on historical sites across England.